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Abstract 
Individual prime ministers’ personalities, leadership styles and political skills 
matter and make a difference. It is important to develop ways of understanding 
and analysing the components of prime-ministerial leadership and personal style 
and skills within a framework permitting comparison, generalization and 
evaluation. The paper argues that some of the most influential accounts of the US 
presidency should be explored to assess their potential for enhancing our 
understanding of British prime ministers and the premiership. Drawing upon 
Fred Greenstein’s influential analysis of The Presidential Difference, the paper 
evaluates Gordon Brown’s leadership style and skills under six headings: (1) 
proficiency as a public communicator, (2) organizational capacity, (3) political 
skills, (4) policy vision, (5) cognitive style and (6) emotional intelligence. Overall, 
Brown can be seen as someone not well equipped for the highest office, in terms 
of the key leadership abilities, characteristics and skills that Greenstein identifies. 
This does not mean that he was bound to fail and to go down to electoral defeat. 
But in the situation he and the Labour government were in after 2007, it made it 
very much harder to be successful.   
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Political scientists have developed a range of theories, approaches and models to 
analyse the British prime ministership. The dominant contemporary political 
science models of the core executive, prime-ministerial predominance and 
presidentialization analyse and seek to explain the functioning, powers and 
development of the office of prime minister in the British political and 
governmental system. Prime ministers themselves – the individuals holding the 
office – get much less attention from political scientists (as opposed to historians, 
biographers and journalists). Individual prime ministers’ personalities, 
leadership styles and political skills tend to be regarded as variables of 
secondary significance, if they are seen as relevant at all. The focus is instead 
very much on institutions, structures, networks and resources. But Richard 
Heffernan has argued that ‘prime ministerial studies must factor in the prime 
minister’s personality and style’,  ‘describe and analyse what [prime ministers] 
do’, and take account of their ‘personal skill and ability’ (Heffernan, 2005, 615-
17). Without privileging agency over structure, the personal attributes and skills 
of a prime minister, he contends, do matter and make a difference. Bowles, King 
and Ross (2007, 385-6) also suggest that the increasingly centralized and 
personalized nature of political leadership in the British executive means ‘the 
impact of the personal traits of the prime minister’ should be on the research 
agenda: ‘just how important are skill, character and experience to understanding 
the success of the British premier?’ 
In contrast to the many US studies of the presidential leadership role and 
the impact of personality on that office, there is a ‘dearth of systematic studies on 
the individual characteristics of prime ministers and on the personal 
components of leadership’ (Foley, 2000, 246). Core executive studies may 
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downplay ‘personality’ as a factor in explaining how government works, but the 
real need is to unpack that vague and general catch-all term and to develop ways 
of understanding and analysing the components of prime-ministerial leadership 
and personal style and skills, within a framework permitting comparison, 
generalization and evaluation.  
The argument here is that some of the most influential accounts of the US 
presidency offer a way forward and should be explored to assess their potential 
for enhancing our understanding of British prime ministers and the premiership. 
As an initial step in this process, and to show what might be possible with this 
conceptual ‘borrowing’, this article uses the model developed by Fred Greenstein 
in his influential book, The Presidential Difference (2001, 2009b) to analyse and 
evaluate Gordon Brown’s leadership style and skills as prime minister. Brown 
has been described by critics as ‘overwhelmed by a job that was much harder 
than he anticipated’ and as ‘defeated by so many of the challenges of leadership’ 
(The Observer, 18 July 2010), by a ministerial ally as lacking the ‘skill-set’ for 
prime minister (Douglas Alexander quoted in Mandelson, 2010, 489), and as 
admitting privately himself that he was not ‘a good Prime Minister’ (Mandelson, 
2010, 13). Using Greenstein’s model, the article aims to assess Brown’s strengths 
and weaknesses as prime minister – how well did he perform and ‘measure up’ 
against the modern requirements of the role? 
 
 
Borrowing from presidential studies 
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The argument that ‘the vast literature on the American Presidency can be used to 
suggest questions that might usefully be asked of the Prime Ministership in 
Britain’ was made by Anthony King over forty years ago (King, 1969, viii) and 
has been repeated a number of times since. Philip Norton (1987, 326) argued 
that a number of the most influential American analyses of presidential power 
have ‘a wider, suggestive relevance’. Michael Foley has insisted that ‘the use of 
the analytical perspectives associated with the presidency’ can afford ‘a deeper 
insight into the contemporary nature of prime ministerial power’ (Foley, 1993, 
20), while Bowles, King and Ross argue that ‘models of American presidential 
leadership can help explicate and improve our understanding of the changing 
executive politics on this side of the Atlantic’, and that there are ‘important ideas, 
variables, concepts and theories to be gleaned from the established field of 
Presidential Studies’ (Bowles et al, 2007, 372, 385). 
Outside of the general debate about the presidentialization of the 
premiership (Foley 1993 and 2000) there have been few attempts to apply 
specific ideas, frameworks or models from the field of presidential studies to the 
study of the British prime minister. Norton (1987) used James David Barber’s 
famous analysis of The Presidential Character (1972) as a starting point to sketch 
out a model of prime-ministerial power based on the interrelationship of 
purpose, skill and circumstance, and to develop a typology of prime ministers 
(‘innovators’, ‘reformers’, ‘egoists’ and ‘balancers’). But there has been no full-
scale British equivalent of Barber’s book. Ellis (2002) used Richard Neustadt’s 
Presidential Power (1960) as an analytical tool to assess Harold Macmillan’s 
premiership, arguing that Neustadt’s insights into the ‘power to persuade’ 
provide a way into analysing the personal influence and skills of a chosen prime 
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minister and cast light on the nature of the premiership in general. Theakston 
(2002) used a ‘skill-in-context’ model, inspired by Erwin Hargrove’s similar 
approach to conceptualizing presidential leadership (Hargrove 1998 and 2002), 
to assess and compare Callaghan, Thatcher, Major and Blair as prime ministers 
and political leaders. Taking a longer time-span – looking at prime ministers 
back to 1945 – Theakston (2007) then applied Fred Greenstein’s model, set out 
in his (2001) book The Presidential Difference, to compare the strengths and 
weaknesses of different postwar prime ministers and weigh up what makes for 
an effective prime minister.  
Greenstein built on, but went beyond, Neustadt and Barber to develop a 
six-point framework for analysing the political and personal qualities and skills 
of US presidents, their characters and leadership styles, and their successes and 
failures in office (Greenstein 2006). He assesses and compares presidents in 
relation to: (1) their proficiency as public communicators, (2) organizational 
capacity, (3) political skills, (4) policy vision, (5) cognitive style and (6) 
emotional intelligence. These qualities come in pairs: public communication is 
the outer face of leadership; organization is the inner face. Skill is complemented 
by the vision to which it is directed. Cognition and emotion are deeper and more 
psychological variables.  
The performance of presidents usually being mixed, the argument is that 
there is at least as much to be learned from their failures and limitations in these 
terms as from their successes and strengths. Greenstein is able to reveal 
shortcomings in the leadership of presidents generally regarded as ‘successful’ 
and the strengths of presidents usually written off as ‘failures’ (Rae 2002, 422). 
He does not present his six qualities in any particular order of significance but 
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argues that while some presidential limitations or skill-gaps can be compensated 
for, a defective temperament or the lack of emotional intelligence can be a truly 
destructive weakness (Greenstein, 2001, 200). Some of his critics, however, 
argue that policy vision – a sense of direction and the values a president stands 
for – is at least as important, suggesting that performance in the White House 
cannot be judged by considering form in isolation from content. Meena Bose 
ranks vision as first in order of importance, followed by political skill, 
organisational capacity and public communication, with cognitive style and 
emotional intelligence as less important factors (Bose 2006).  
Greenstein (2006, 22) maintains he is applying a set of common criteria 
for analysing and comparing presidents that relate to the demands of the 
presidential role. But critics argue that his categories may be too wide and elastic 
(e.g. his comments on ‘cognitive style’) or insufficiently rigorous (e.g. criticisms 
of ‘emotional intelligence’ as ‘pop psychology’) (Renshon, 2001; Lichtman, 2000). 
Other writers came up with different ‘must have’ lists of skills needed to be 
successful in the White House (e.g. Gergen, 2000). Lichtman (2000) criticised the 
attempt to deconstruct presidential leadership as the sum of separate parts, 
argued that Greenstein’s categories were arbitrary, rigid and ahistorical, and 
suggested that they presented unexamined tensions (‘at what point . . . does 
vision become ideological rigidity or attention to organisational form become 
preoccupation with detail?’). But Greenstein’s book has had a wide appeal and 
influence (including on pundits and practitioners), based on the accessibility, 
coherence and economy of his checklist approach, on his historical 
understanding of the presidency, and on his shrewd insights into the political 
and personal qualities of individual presidents. 
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Greenstein’s original formulation of his model was certainly open to the 
criticism that he neglected the importance of context and the wider political 
environment. The inheritance of an incoming leader, the circumstances faced 
and the problems on the political agenda all needed to be factored in. What did 
the times demand, and what did they permit? Discernment or insight into the 
nature of the times was perhaps a key presidential skill. Also, it was argued that 
perhaps some of the qualities, traits or skills Greenstein noted were more 
important in some times or situations than in others (Langston, 2001). In some 
later presentations of his model, however, Greenstein did acknowledge the 
importance of contextual factors, and that the nexus between the personal 
qualities of presidents and the demands of the times was central to their 
effectiveness. ‘The capacity of the president to make a difference’, he conceded, 
‘is a function not only of his personal attributes, but also the political 
environment in which they are brought to bear. A president who is well suited to 
serve in one setting may be ill suited for another’ (Greenstein, 2005, 228). 
Moreover some skills may matter more at different stages or in different phases 
of a presidency – Burke (2006, 58-9) argues that organisational abilities are 
particularly important during presidential transitions, with the shift from 
campaigning to governing and the need to establish advisory structures and a 
White House organisation and decision-making process. 
Although developed to analyse ‘the modern presidency’ (Greenstein, 2001, 
3) from FDR onwards, Greenstein’s analytical framework can – with care - be 
applied comparatively. Chamorel (2003) has used it to assess and compare the 
leadership of French presidents from De Gaulle to Chirac. Greenstein has also 
gone back into history to analyse the leadership styles of the early presidents 
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from George Washington to Andrew Jackson, applying his model to the very 
different political world of late-18th and early 19th-century America (Greenstein 
2009a).  In The Presidential Difference it is true that he suggested that in Britain, 
with its ‘tradition of collective leadership’, the personal leadership style and 
skills of the prime minister were almost beside the point: ‘the rare Winston 
Churchill, Margaret Thatcher, or Tony Blair is far outnumbered by the many 
Stanley Baldwins, Harold Wilsons and John Majors, whose personal impact on 
governmental actions is at best limited’ (Greenstein, 2001, 3). But Greenstein 
now accepts that the personal qualities of even the ‘ordinary’ or second-rank 
British prime ministers can make a difference and believes that his model 
provides yardsticks that would permit comparisons across nations (personal 
communication with the author, January 2010).   
Different institutional contexts and processes do call for somewhat 
different skills and priorities from leaders in different countries and political 
systems (Chamorel 2003). Prime ministers have to be assessed within the 
context of the British system and in relation to the powers, constraints and 
opportunities of the office they hold. But allowing for constitutional, institutional 
and political differences between the US and British systems, it is possible to 
apply the Greenstein model to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of British 
prime ministers and provide insights into the reasons for success and failure in 
Number 10 (Theakston 2007). Buller and James (2008) have argued that 
Bulpitt’s ‘statecraft’ model (focussed on party management, winning the battle of 
ideas, developing a successful electoral strategy, and demonstrating ‘governing 
competence’) is better suited to analysing leadership within the British system of 
strong party government. British prime ministers do have to manage their 
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Cabinets, operate in a parliamentary system, and lead and manage their parties 
in ways that US presidents do not, but the skills and qualities needed to do so can 
arguably be encompassed within the Greenstein categories (calling on a mixture 
of political, organisational and communication skills, for instance), and 
Greenstein provides a broader checklist than Bultpitt when it comes to probing 
the individual factor and the impact of a prime minister’s personal and political 
skills, style and character (the ‘statecraft’ model focussing more on the collective 
leadership group). Greenstein prompts us to ask good questions about what 
prime ministers have to do, and how well they do it, as political and government 
leaders. 
 
 
Public Communication 
 
Effectiveness as a public communicator comes first in Greenstein’s checklist 
though as noted earlier, he does not rank-order his six qualities. Bose (2006, 33) 
argues that while communication skills can enhance presidential leadership, 
they should rank lower in importance than vision, political skill and organisation, 
because it is the substance of those other qualities that will ultimately determine 
the success of communication. Strong policies, she suggests, may compensate for 
deficiencies in public communication. Peter Mandelson (2010, 6) also argues 
that ‘clear, bold policy’, good organisation, and getting good people in place – 
‘something serious . . . happening’ - are required for ‘communications success’. 
Even in the modern media environment, there is much more to the prime 
minister’s job, in other words, than being a good communicator.  However, while 
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arguing that ‘a role in the mobilization of popular opinion is not as important in 
the job description of a prime minister as in that of an American president’, Colin 
Seymour-Ure (1995, 171) insists a prime minister ‘has a need and an unequalled 
opportunity to use the “power to persuade”’, adding that ‘good media 
management can make a crucial difference to success.’ 
Just as Greenstein picks out only a handful of modern presidents as 
outstanding communicators (Roosevelt, Kennedy, Reagan, Clinton at his best, 
Obama), so there have been only a few real communication ‘stars’ among prime 
ministers over recent decades – and Brown was clearly not among them. Harold 
Wilson and particularly Tony Blair stand out for their communication and 
presentation skills and their abilities as political showmen. Brown would rank 
alongside the likes of Clement Attlee, Alec Douglas-Home, Edward Heath and 
John Major, who all disliked the idea of ‘selling’ or promoting themselves and 
their policies, and who recoiled from political ‘packaging’ and image-building. 
Brown suffered on this count through comparison with Blair and with David 
Cameron – both telegenic, persuasive, able to reach out to the public, sell their 
ideas and project empathy and sincerity. He tried to make a virtue of his lack of 
slickness, purporting to scorn the politics of celebrity and image – ‘not flash, just 
Gordon’. At first, his more subdued style appealed to some as a welcome change 
from Blair’s prime-minister-as-actor-on-the-screen approach. But ‘as time went 
on, it became increasingly evident that Brown lacked the range of presentational 
skills required to be a successful modern leader’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 525), and he 
paid a price for his weaknesses and limitations as a communicator. 
‘A prime minister needs a different set of skills from a chancellor of the 
exchequer’, an anti-Brown Labour backbencher said in 2008. ‘A prime minister 
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must be able to communicate, persuade and enthuse. If not, the message is lost’ 
(The Times, 29 July 2008).  ‘He’s crap at communication’, a minister summed up 
bluntly, ‘and the role of a leader is to communicate’ (The Times, 3 June 2008). So 
much was it the conventional wisdom that prime minister Brown was a poor 
communicator and uncomfortable with the mass media, it was often forgotten 
that he had worked as a television producer for three years before entering 
parliament and, as an ambitious and rising MP in the 1980s, had won plaudits as 
a skilful and biting Commons speaker, a master of the sound-bites. As chancellor 
and as prime minister his speechmaking style was described as monotone and 
relentless, involving ‘a barrage of lists, facts and achievements’ or ‘firing out 
machine-gum fusillades of statistics’ (New Statesman, 5 February 2010; New 
York Review of Books, 25 October 2007). At his best, it was said that he could be 
‘a forceful speaker, but not a great debater’ and ‘most impressive when rousing a 
crowd of believers’, for instance at party conferences (Rawnsley, 2010, 56, 58). 
Blair, though, was better able to reach out to, connect with and persuade the 
wider public.  
Brown could pack a real intellectual punch with his speeches – some 
drawing on and quoting a tremendous range of sources and heavyweight 
thinkers. ‘He would probably have done quite well in the 19th century, making 
long speeches like Gladstone’, was one view (Hughes, 2010, 206). But his style 
and public personality were not well suited to the business of connecting with a 
modern electorate through television. ‘I’ve got all the policy, all the ideas’, Brown 
would insist (though this claim is debatable – see below). ‘I just can’t 
communicate it’ (Mandelson, 2010, 6). Brown himself felt that he lacked the 
communication skills for modern politics: ‘I’m good at what politics used to be 
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about, about policies’, he said. ‘But now people want celebrity and theatre’ 
(Mandelson, 2010, 14). Attempts to lighten or to humanise his image often ended 
up backfiring and making things worse, as with his infamous ‘YouTube’ 
appearance. The contemporary political-media culture, argued Steve Richards, ‘is 
entirely at odds with Gordon Brown’s political style and explains why he has 
failed to engage with the electorate as prime minister’ (The Independent, 4 
September 2009). Brown had entered Number 10 saying ‘I have never believed 
presentation should be the substitute for policy’ (Price, 2010, 394). But he came 
to acknowledge his shortcomings as a communicator and that ‘that’s not the way 
politics works these days’, accepting ‘I have to do better in the presentation area’ 
(GQ, December 2009, 113). 
The idea that the Brown premiership would bring ‘the end of spin’ was 
never credible given the aggressive media management he and his entourage 
had long practised (Price, 2010, 394-5). Peter Mandelson (2010, 15) describes 
Brown as ‘transfixed by the media’ and obsessed by headlines and the need for a 
constant stream of eye-catching ‘announcements’. The real criticism was that 
Brown did not have a proper media strategy as prime minister and his Number 
10 media operation could have been more effective, with the lack of a political 
heavyweight with hard-edged journalistic experience at the PM’s side (a Joe 
Haines, Bernard Ingham or Alastair Campbell figure) being a particular 
weakness (Price, 2010, 438; The Independent, 14 April 2009). 
 
 
Organisational Capacity 
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This aspect of presidential leadership is about forging an effective advisory 
system in the White House and the ability to ‘design effective institutional 
arrangements’ (Greenstein, 2001, 195-7). In the British context, the relevant 
issues relate to the prime minister and the Number 10 staff, the machinery of 
government, and the organisation and use of the Cabinet system. Most prime 
ministers (like other politicians) – though, arguably, Attlee and Heath were 
exceptions - tend to ‘see politics through speeches’ rather than in terms of 
managing institutions, people and systems to achieve results (Donoughue, 2005, 
586; Hoskyns, 2000, 326). The problem with Blair was that he had never 
managed anything, his Cabinet Secretary once bluntly told the prime minister; 
Seldon (2007, 224) described Blair’s management style as ‘erratic’. Brown, 
complained one civil servant, ‘had no more idea’ of effective management 
(Seldon, 2004, 629). 
Blair had greatly increased the size of the prime minister’s staff, 
importing more politically-appointed advisers and aides and creating a plethora 
of new units and offices, though the regular Number 10 reorganisations over his 
tenure suggested that he never quite felt the set-up was right or working 
properly, and one adviser thought that his Number 10 operation was 
‘amateurish’ (Seldon, 2007, 223). Attempting to signal a distancing from Blair’s 
‘sofa government’, ‘denocracy’ and presidential style, Brown initially brought 
over with him from the Treasury only a handful of advisers and trusted officials 
to run Number 10. It was always his preference to work through a small and 
tight inner group, but it was soon apparent that the prime minister’s office had to 
be strengthened to deal with the demands of the modern premiership. Some of 
Brown’s changes – such as the appointment of Jeremy Heywood as the first 
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Number 10 permanent secretary to pull together the civil service side and 
progress-chase – were successful. But on the political, media and strategy sides 
there were more problems, and a succession of staff changes and infighting 
(particularly during Stephen Carter’s ill-fated time as strategy director, when he 
clashed with the old Brown political clique) that damaged ‘the image and the 
effectiveness of his administration’ (Price, 2010, 409). Brown’s Number 10 was 
often labelled ‘chaotic’ or ‘dysfunctional’. One official argued that Brown 
‘surrounded himself with people who amplified his weaknesses rather than 
compensated for them’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 520). ‘Brown is not challenged by his 
advisers intellectually’, was another criticism. He had filled Number 10 with 
‘apparatchiks and spinners’ (Hughes, 2010, 211). Moreover the Brown coterie 
were reported to be ‘very reluctant to tell him when he was wrong. None of his 
people liked to contradict him’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 524). Mandelson (2010, 448) 
felt that Brown’s Number 10 operation was too ‘fragmented’ to be effective in 
contemporary conditions. He quoted a Brown adviser complaining that ‘Gordon 
is a hub-and-spokes operator. He’s the hub, and he works through a lot of 
separate spokes, rather than an integrated machine.’ Another member of 
Brown’s team said: ‘He only trusts people in boxes, silos. He listens to them in 
that particular context, like he would use an electrician or bring in a plumber. 
He’s not geared to run a group that interacts, communicates with one another’ 
(Mandelson, 2010, 24).  
British prime ministers rarely take much interest in issues of government 
machinery and management – crucial though these may be to the development 
and implementation of their policies - their departmental reorganisations and 
tinkering usually being prompted by political or presentational motives. Heath in 
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the 1970s stands out as a prime minister fascinated by government machinery 
and prepared to think from first principles about Whitehall organisation and 
reform. Brown was no Heath in this respect, but then neither were Thatcher or 
Blair, who were more people-centred in the way they approached government 
rather than organisation-centred. Brown had moulded the Treasury around 
himself and (like Blair and some other New Labour ministers) had been 
mistrustful of and impatient with the traditional Whitehall methods and civil 
service personnel. He had ordered the merger of the big tax departments, 
Customs and Excise and the Inland Revenue, while imposing staff cuts and 
savings that compromised performance and efficiency. His main departmental 
changes as prime minister all involved promotions or boosts for political allies: 
the creation of the Department for Children, Schools and Families, headed by Ed 
Balls, and of the Department of Energy and Climate Change, under Ed Miliband, 
together with the expansion of Peter Mandelson’s empire in 2009 with the 
merger creating the Department for Business, Innovations and Skills. A vague 
‘big plan’ to reshape Whitehall and restructure government into three major 
policy directorates (foreign, domestic and economic policy, with ministerial 
‘policy supremos’) never got off the drawing board (Mandelson, 2010, 457). 
A return to collective Cabinet government was promised but the 
controlling and micro-managing Brown could hardly reinvent himself as an 
Attlee-esque chairman of the Cabinet. Mandelson (2010, 442-3) claims that 
discussions around the Cabinet table were longer and more substantial under 
Brown than they had been under Blair, and says Brown would listen to the 
speakers but his impatience sometimes suggested he would rather be elsewhere. 
Geoff Hoon felt that neither Blair nor Brown had ‘any time for ministers’. The 
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difference was, he went on, that Blair ‘broadly let you get on with it [and] wasn’t 
much interested unless something went wrong’, whereas Brown ‘wants to 
interfere in everything. He’s temperamentally incapable of delegating 
responsibility’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 523). Peter Riddell noted that Brown’s 
‘preferred method of operation is via telephone calls. So sofa government has 
been replaced by telephone government, with similarly little formal procedure 
or papers’ (The Times, 4 December 2008). There were few ‘ad hoc’ or ‘MISC’ 
Cabinet committee’s in Brown’s system (only six by 2010), but Brown himself 
chaired two key central committees: NEC, the National Economic Council 
handling economic policy and the recession (Blair had not chaired his own 
government’s economic policy committee), and NSID, the lead committee on 
national security, international relations and development. 
Brown was depicted as a dominating figure at the start. Blair had had to 
share power with Brown, running a sort of rival government from the Treasury, 
but there were said to be no ‘big beasts’ or ‘alternative prime ministers’ in 
Brown’s Cabinet (Hughes, 2010, 30). The Cabinets of other post-war premiers 
had contained ministers with reputations and power-bases of their own, and 
there had been some heavyweight ministers under Blair (John Prescott, David 
Blunkett, John Reid, Charles Clarke). But there was, it was suggested, no one with 
the weight to challenge Brown (Rawnsley, 2010, 463-4). However, the picture of 
a hegemonic prime minister could hardly be sustained as events, mistakes, party 
unrest and Cabinet plots engulfed him. The return of Mandelson provided a 
political shield but the stories of Cabinet ministers (including Jack Straw, Alistair 
Darling and Harriet Harman) forcing a string of concessions on policy and 
strategy from the prime minister after the third abortive coup attempt in January 
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2010 spoke eloquently of dependency not ascendancy in Brown’s position in the 
core executive.  
 
Political Skill 
 
Under this heading Greenstein assesses presidents as political operators, using 
skills in persuasion, negotiation, manoeuvre and deal-making to work the 
Washington system, deal with the problems they face and advance their goals. 
Successful political management requires British prime ministers to use a range 
of skills in terms of persuasion, conciliation, manipulation and brokerage with 
their Cabinet colleagues, parties and others, and calls for political sensitivity and 
good political antennae; individual premiers can have very different abilities and 
aptitudes in this respect (Norton, 1987, 332-9; Theakston, 2007, 236-8).  
Blair had doubts about how far Brown had what he thought was the vital 
political gift of ‘intuition – what to do, when to do it, how to say it, how to bring 
people along’ (Mandelson, 2010, 10). Brown was certainly never going to be able 
to emulate Blair’s almost Rooseveltian political use of personal charm to 
‘schmooze’, persuade, win people over and avoid conflict (Rawnsley, 2010, 57). 
Brown was more the ‘big clunking fist’, as Blair himself put it, ‘Stalinist in his 
ruthlessness’ in the way that he operated, according to a former Cabinet 
Secretary. It was almost as if he would rather be feared than loved. He was 
described as having a ‘mastery of machine politics’ and using ‘faction boss 
methods’. His negotiating style was ‘bone-crunching’; he ‘steam-rollered’ and 
intimidated rather than reasoned or persuaded (Rawnsley, 2010, 69, 74, 434; 
Bower, 2007, 4, 109-10). Cabinet ministers had come to regard him as ‘secretive, 
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cliqueish and vengeful’ at the Treasury, a political bruiser and a brutal operator 
(Rawnsley, 2010, 461). ‘His standard operating procedure as chancellor was to 
hold back from expressing a view and then suddenly hit his Cabinet colleagues 
with a fully worked-out position backed up with Treasury papers at the last 
minute, so that they had little time to respond’ (The Independent, 28 August 
2009). One minister on the receiving end of his methods described Brown as 
‘authoritarian, impatient and arrogant. He believes in laying down the law rather 
than negotiating’ (Hughes, 2010, 170).  
In more positive terms, Brown was depicted as the ‘consummate 
strategist’, ‘the biggest political brain in the Labour Party’ with ‘the ability to see 
where the politics of something is going’, the ‘great chess player of British 
politics, the man who always thought a dozen moves ahead’ (Hughes, 2010, 75, 
209; Rawnsley, 2010, 510). But he was also ‘the scheming fixer . . . the petty 
infighter . . . [and the] endlessly prevaricating, indecisive, fiddling tactician’ 
(Hughes, 2010, 3). His aim was always to carve out ‘dividing lines’ with 
opponents that exposed their vulnerability (Rawnsley, 2010, 58). His ‘time 
horizon’ was described as ‘extraordinarily short’. ‘He’s always thinking how do 
we get ourselves out of a corner and put someone else in a corner’ (Rawnsley, 
2010, 585). However, the build up to and the procrastination over the ‘election 
that never was’ in the autumn of 2007 – allowing expectations to run out of 
control before deciding finally not to go to the country - exposed both ‘tactical 
foolishness’ and ‘strategic stupidity’, as Rawnsley (2010, 510) describes what 
was arguably Brown’s biggest political mistake as prime minister. Brown later 
felt he should have gone ahead with an election in 2007 (Mandelson, 2010, 13). 
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Brown did have the ability to attract and retain tribal support as a sort of 
‘clan chieftain’ in the Labour Party (Bower, 2007, xiii), winning and keeping the 
backing of a network of ‘Brownite’ MPs and ministers on the road to Number 10. 
He expected and required total loyalty while also licensing close aides like 
Charlie Whelan and Damian McBride to act as thuggish behind-the-scenes 
hatchet-men, spinners, attack-dogs and assassins. Brown was never squeamish 
about or reluctant to resort to the political black arts or methods of ‘terrorism’ 
(Bower, 2007, 191). The likes of Whelan and McBride did what they thought 
Brown wanted them to do, raising questions about his judgement and political 
style in terms of whom he chose as close allies, how he dealt with opponents and 
rivals, and his approach to the media (The Independent, 14 April 2009). This was 
the ‘dark side’ of the purportedly ‘ideologically serious, morally driven 
statesmen’ (Hughes, 2010, 183). 
Prime ministers have to be able to build and maintain a coalition of 
different and sometimes conflicting interests, groups and personalities. But 
critics had argued that Brown was ‘instinctively unwilling to engage foes and 
placate the outraged. He lacked the essential attributes of emollience and 
encouragement to gather together a coalition of supporters to respect his 
leadership’ (Bower, 2007, 455). However as prime minister he did reach out to 
senior Blairites, giving some of them Cabinet positions, and even made some ‘big 
tent’ gestures (offering former Liberal leader Paddy Ashdown a Cabinet post and 
bringing in outside recruits at junior minister level – the ‘GOATS’ – to what was 
dubbed a ‘government of all the talents’). But he remained a suspicious and 
cliqueish figure rather than genuinely pluralist (Rawnsley, 2010, 461-5). 
Bringing back Peter Mandelson in 2008 was an audacious move that reflected 
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the weakness of Brown’s political position, supplying much-needed 
presentational and strategic skills to the centre of government while also 
providing a prop and ally in the face of plots against the prime minister, but at 
the cost of making Brown dependent on his former bitter enemy. The June 2009 
Cabinet resignations and coup attempt further underlined Brown’s vulnerability 
– he could not move senior ministers (like Alistair Darling or David Miliband) to 
other posts against their will and his premiership could have been finished if 
they too had resigned. 
Bower (2007, 314-15) argued that Brown was temperamentally unsuited 
and lacked the political skills needed for working with his counterparts in other 
countries. As chancellor he clearly disliked EU finance ministers’ meetings and 
was reportedly loathed by the other ministers: ‘conciliation and diplomacy, the 
essential ingredients of European negotiations towards collective decisions, did 
not appeal to [him].’ His approach could be seen in a different way, however, a 
senior official suggesting that ‘Tony [Blair] was the weaker negotiator. If you 
want to put someone in a room with other EU leaders, give me Gordon any day. 
Gordon is stronger because he doesn’t care whether people hate him and Tony 
does’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 58). It should also be noted that Brown performed 
impressively and was in his element in the negotiations and meetings of world 
leaders (the G20) in 2009, responding to the global financial crisis. ‘Grinding out 
deals, that is what Gordon likes doing and that is what he does best’, said one 
insider. Both Obama and Sarkozy praised Brown’s skills and the role he played in 
the high-level economic summitry (Rawnsley, 2010, 629, 632, 634). 
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Policy Vision 
 
The ‘vision thing’ is not about a leader having an ‘ism’ in a dogmatic ideological 
sense, but possessing and articulating clear long-term goals and some 
overarching ideas and priorities that can provide coherence for the government 
and give it a sense of direction and purpose. Just as most of the modern US 
presidents have been pragmatists of one sort or another, so vision-driven prime 
ministers have been the exception not the rule in Britain. With the traditional 
model of collective Cabinet and party government it may not have mattered too 
much that many prime ministers did not provide distinctive policy agendas, a 
strong lead or ideas of their own but contemporary expectations are different. 
Both Thatcher and Blair saw it as vital to win the battle of ideas and to push 
forward with their own policies and goals, though Thatcher was more successful 
on this front as Blair’s ‘third way’ and ‘modernisation’ ideas failed to give much 
in the way of consistency or clarity to government, often seeming to descend into 
‘waffle and cliché’ (Seldon, 2004, 148). 
Brown had little time for Blair’s ‘third way’ and it suited him in the years 
before 2007 to seem a bit more to the ‘left’ and more authentically ‘Labour’ than 
Blair. Some of this was political tribalism, some of it was about maintaining party 
support and his stranglehold on the succession, but some of it reflected his 
deeper understanding of its socialist traditions and doctrines and stronger roots 
in the party than Blair (who delighted in ‘taking on’ his party and attacking its 
sacred cows).  Some thought or hoped that he would break from Blairism and 
New Labour and eagerly anticipated radical new ideas and bold plans from a 
man who described himself at the start of his leadership as a ‘conviction 
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politician’ with a ‘moral compass’ (Hughes, 2010, 11). Brown, as Watt  (2010, 7-
8) puts it, ‘had been so desperate to become Prime Minister, and had plotted so 
meticulously and ruthlessly to get to No. 10, that we all assumed he knew what 
he was going to do when he got there.’ However, it soon emerged that there was 
‘no vision, no strategy . . . [no] grand plan . . . Gordon was simply making it up as 
he went along.’ 
As a co-architect of New Labour from the start, and with his powerful 
influence from the Treasury over domestic policy after 1997, Brown – for all he 
positioned himself as ‘not Blair’ or even ‘anti-Blair’ - could hardly be expected to 
disown the past and engage in a complete ideological and policy redirection. In 
the post-war period, mid-term successions and changes of prime minister 
without a change of party have not resulted in significant shifts in policy 
direction (Griffiths, 2009, 55). Broad policy continuity rather than a radical break 
or ‘fresh start’ could be expected.  
There were plenty of ‘initiatives’ from Brown (‘too many’ according to a 
former minister) but, overall, an ‘incoherent policy agenda’ and an inability to 
‘plant a firm enough idea of what he stands for’ (Hughes, 2010, 213, 231). There 
was no ‘strategy for government’, as a Number 10 aide admitted. Brown seemed 
to have ‘run out of ideas, seemed to have run out of big projects’, argued Vince 
Cable, something putting his government at the mercy of events. Blair was 
reportedly concerned that Brown ‘hasn’t got a plan’. The absence of a coherent 
programme and compelling narrative led a Cabinet minister to complain that ‘the 
dots aren’t being joined up’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 526-7). Mandelson felt that Brown 
had a ‘tendency to react to events’ and to short-termism (2010, 451), and argues 
that while he did ‘see the big picture’, he tended to look to create ‘tactical 
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opportunities’ rather than ‘a strategy to advance it’ (2010, 15). Brown’s 
government, argue Beech and Lee (2009, 101), ‘suffered from the prime 
minister’s failure to adequately articulate his vision . . . the general lack of an 
ideological narrative . . . hampered his effectiveness [as prime minister]’ (see 
also: Beech, 2009).  
Brown cited the need for more time to spell out his ‘vision for Britain’ as 
one of the key reasons for not calling an election in the autumn of 2007 (Hughes, 
2010, 134). Two years later, media critics were claiming that he ‘doesn’t know 
what he believes in’ (Guardian, 3 September 2009). He has been labelled 
variously as a statist and social engineer, a technocratic Treasury centraliser, the 
heir to Thatcher, the heir to Blair, a man of the left or at least the centre-left, a 
practitioner of ‘cautious Blairism’ (Hughes, 2010, 126), and someone whose 
personal political philosophy has been more influenced by market liberalism and 
the ideas of US thinkers (including neo-conservatives) than by European social-
democracy, becoming increasingly distant from the Labour Party’s mainstream 
ideas (Lee, 2007). Brown was criticised for his lack of clarity and for ‘facing both 
ways’ (Bower, 2007, 492), but Thatcher’s ideas about economy, state and society 
had also been a complex and not necessarily coherent or ideologically consistent 
mix. The difference was her greater ability to project and sell her ideas. Brown’s 
failure to set out a plausible ‘narrative’ about what he was doing and trying to 
achieve – communicating a strategic sense of direction – damaged his credibility 
and weakened his leadership.  
 
 
Cognitive Style 
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British prime ministers – like US presidents – vary widely in their cognitive 
styles, or the way in which they process and deal with advice and information 
and approach decision-making. It has suited some to seem to be less intelligent 
than they really are (such as Baldwin). Some have worked through a process of 
intuition, instinct and imagination rather than by prolonged calculation of the 
pros and cons (such as Churchill). Some have preferred to work in an orderly 
way and through paper rather than listening to people (Attlee), while others 
liked verbal advice and had a more freewheeling and intellectually agile style 
(Wilson). Heath’s approach was rational and problem-solving, preferring hard 
facts and concrete recommendations to big ideas, while Thatcher was 
aggressively argumentative not calmly analytical, combining command of details 
and black-and-white instant certainty. Major was not a conceptual, strategic or 
big-picture thinker but more the reactive problem-solver and details man 
(Theakston, 2007, 241-4). 
Formal educational achievement is not the point. Two of the last six prime 
ministers did not go to university (Callaghan and Major) while Brown is the only 
British prime minister with a PhD. A formidable thinker, seriously interested in 
history and in ideas, and who reads widely and himself writes books, Brown was 
the most intellectual prime minister since Macmillan. Intellectuals have a mixed 
record in Number 10, however, as the contrasting fates of prime ministers like 
Balfour, Rosebery and Gladstone suggests. It is arguably more important for 
prime ministers to know how to make use of intellectuals than to be one 
(Prospect, 2007, 28-30). 
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Where Blair was ‘a much more instinctive decision-maker’, according to 
Jack Straw, Brown’s approach was more methodical, cautious and slow 
(Rawnsley, 2010, 523). Brown had a deeper grasp of policy than Blair. But his 
style was marked by narrow calculation and ‘obsessive attention to detail’ (Price, 
2010, 400). Critics argued that his long years at the Treasury were perhaps not a 
good preparation for the premiership. As chancellor, policies could be carefully 
planned and reviews instituted, giving him time to make up his mind. Chancellor 
Brown only rarely had to do ‘the spontaneous and the immediate’, but as prime 
minister the unpredictable and the press of events gave him no choice (The 
Times, 2 July 2007). Moreover, Brown was said to be someone who wanted to 
concentrate on issues one at a time, refusing to consider other questions until he 
had thoroughly gone through the options and the minutiae, considered all the 
angles and all the risks, and had finally come to a decision. A prime minister has 
to be able to deal with multiple problems and fast-moving crises, and critics 
doubted that Brown’s ponderous and inflexible style was suited to the day-to-
day demands and pressures of Number 10.  
As Rawnsley (2010, 522) puts it, Brown ‘did not excel at multi-tasking. 
His preference and his forte were to concentrate on one big thing at a time. He 
had largely been able to do that at the Treasury, where he could focus on the four 
or five major events of a Chancellor’s year. Prime Ministers can get hit by four or 
five major events in a month, or even a week . . . Torrential volumes of business 
flow through Downing Street, much of it demanding instant attention.’ ‘As Prime 
Minister’, an insider told Rawnsley, ‘you are bombarded with things.’ 
It was not long before there were complaints that decisions were piling 
up and that while Brown burned the midnight oil, constantly demanding more 
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papers and information, he came to seem indecisive, vacillating and dithering. On 
one matter after another  (the ‘non-election’ of autumn 2007, the 10 pence tax 
rate, the expenses scandal), there seemed a crippling ‘inability to make big 
decisions’ (Watt, 2010, 174). Brown ‘has a problem with decisions’, said one 
insider bluntly (Financial Times, 6 February 2008). Faced with difficult decisions 
Brown, according to a senior civil servant, ‘just delays and delays, thinking he 
will get a better set of options later. But quite often the options just get worse’ 
(Rawnsley, 2010, 523). 
Worse still, once Brown had made a decision, it was said to be incredibly 
difficult to get him to unmake it.  Conviction that he understood the issues more 
deeply than anyone else bred stubbornness, inflexibility and a damaging 
unwillingness to change course or compromise in the face of public discontent, 
media criticism or backbench pressure (Hughes, 2010, 211). Brown was said to 
dislike open debate or challenge; he had ‘difficulty distinguishing between 
disinterested advice and a stab in the back’, complained one official (Bower, 
2007, 213). Brown ‘copes badly with criticism’ it was claimed (Economist, 24 
November 2007). ‘He can’t bear dissent’, said a Number 10 insider (Sunday 
Times, 18 November 2007). ‘He finds argument very difficult’, reported a senior 
official. ‘His answer is to thump out bullet points until he has ground you down’ 
(Rawnsley, 2010, 56). Knowing that he responded badly to unwelcome advice, 
ministers and advisers could be reluctant to offer it. Overall, while there could be 
no doubting Brown’s impressive intelligence, there were problematic aspects of 
his cognitive style and approach to decision-making that impacted negatively on 
his premiership. 
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Emotional Intelligence 
 
Greenstein is concerned under this heading with how the occupants of the White 
House manage their emotions and turn them to constructive purposes rather 
than being dominated by them and allowing them to diminish their leadership. 
To adapt what was said about Roosevelt, the suggestion is that a ‘first-class 
temperament’ may be more important than a ‘first-class intellect’ in dealing with 
crises and the daily stresses and demands of high office.  
The key question is how far emotional or temperamental flaws impede 
effective presidential or prime-ministerial performance and leadership? 
Greenstein concedes that ‘great political ability does sometimes derive from 
troubled emotions’, but puts most emphasis on the dangers and problems that 
can arise in this area. He admits, however, that while only a third of modern 
presidents have been fundamentally free of ‘distracting emotional perturbations’ 
and another third were seriously ‘emotionally handicapped’ in various ways, a 
final third had ‘emotional undercurrents’ that ‘did not significantly impair’ their 
leadership (Greenstein, 2009b, 229-30). Deficiencies in emotional intelligence 
may not therefore prevent a leader from governing successfully. Indeed, some of 
the great presidents, such as Washington and Lincoln, may not have scored 
highly on emotional intelligence (Bose, 2006, 34-5; Greenstein, 2009a, 23). 
With British prime ministers too it is debateable how far there is a 
correlation between an equable temperament (emphasised by Attlee to be of key 
importance at the top [Field, 2009, 112]) and statesmanship or political 
achievement. Historically, leaders like Gladstone (often tense, moody, excitable, 
impetuous, passionate and angry) or Churchill (prone to violent mood-swings 
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and depression, and warned during the war of his ‘rough, sarcastic and 
overbearing manner’ towards colleagues and officials) would hardly score high 
in terms of emotional stability (Crosby, 1997; Storr, 1969; Jenkins, 2001, 593).  
Post-war premiers appear to have varied greatly in terms of emotional 
intelligence and in their strengths and weaknesses on this dimension of 
Greenstein’s model (Theakston, 2007, 244-7). It was frequently argued that 
Brown showed less emotional intelligence than Blair. Blair’s extrovert and 
optimistic personality was originally a strength, but it is his flaws that stand out 
in David Owen’s analysis of how his hubristic self-confidence and messianic self-
belief led him into the Iraq war (Owen, 2007). On a human level, Brown was 
often described as buttoned up, unsure of himself, and as not possessing an easy 
manner (Mandelson, 2010, 16). The ‘psychologically flawed’ Brown, as Alastair 
Campbell is supposed to have labelled him, could be compared to Anthony Eden 
(petulant, volatile, easily upset and annoyed, bad-tempered) and Edward Heath 
(defensive, introverted, awkward in social and personal relations, sulky), though 
comparisons were also made to another embattled Scottish prime minister, Lord 
Rosebery, Leo McKinstry noting ‘the thin skin, the hyper-sensitivity, the gift for 
cultivating enemies, the brusqueness used to cover up shyness’ (Hughes, 2010, 
109; Spectator, 27 June 2007, 22). 
Brown’s suitability for the premiership was being questioned before he 
even assumed the office. Labour MP Frank Field said he had ‘no empathy with 
people’ and allowing him into Number 10 would be ‘like letting Mrs Rochester 
out of the attic’ (Mail on Sunday, 24 February 2007). Matthew Parris declared 
that Brown was ‘psychologically unfit for the office’ of prime minister, describing 
him as ‘a worryingly closed and leaden personality’ (The Times, 19 May 2007). 
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Tom Bower’s biography ruthlessly dissected Brown’s character, depicting him as 
a ‘brooding volcano’, a man of ‘demons and grudges’, ‘tantrums and offensive 
behaviour’, ‘consumed by hatreds’, insecure and suspicious, awkward and 
uneasy, with poor social skills and a ferocious temper (Bower, 2007, 11, 67, 98, 
194, 302, 344, 376-7, 415). ‘Blair was much the more emotionally intelligent’, 
says Rawnsley (2010, 56), ‘which gave him the advantage in connecting with the 
public and colleagues.’ Brown also suffered by comparison with David Cameron, 
his Conservative rival, who showed more ‘emotional literacy’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 
537).  
Brown was said to be ‘a highly volatile man, more so than his predecessor, 
who usually kept his emotions tightly disciplined’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 536). But for 
all his reported charm, warmth and humour in private life, a negative picture of 
the prime minister’s public and political character was firmly established well 
before the publication of Andrew Rawnsley’s (2010) book triggered a major 
media storm about Brown’s leadership style, personality and alleged rages and 
bullying. His attempt to display a more ‘human’ side by lifting the veil on his 
private grief over the death of his infant daughter in a television interview in 
February 2010 seemed calculated, his long-held preference for privacy on such 
matters being more genuine (Financial Times, 22 February 2010). Brown was 
hardly the first prime minister to have been a difficult or even menacing person 
to deal with and to have a short fuse. Thatcher was once called ‘the Lyndon 
Johnson of modern British politics’ for her ‘hectoring, cajoling, threatening . . . 
bullying’ style and her willingness to humiliate ministers and officials (King, 
1988, 57-8). Blair on the other hand confessed he only lost his temper in public 
situations deliberately and for reasons of calculation (Powell, 2008, 135). Was 
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this aspect of Brown’s character and style connected to mistakes of judgement 
and decision-making? Some commentators argued ‘a prime minister who cannot 
control his emotions is unsuited to the job of making important decisions for the 
country’ (The Times, 23 February 2010) and that Brown’s personal shortcomings 
were ‘deeply destructive to good governance’ and were ‘key to understanding 
why [his] government has been so uncoordinated, unhappy and ineffectual’ 
(Guardian, 26 February 2010), while others argued they ‘do not automatically 
render him unsuited for office’ and were a ‘disadvantage for a national leader . . . 
not a disqualification’ (Financial Times, 22 February 2010). Poll evidence 
suggested the public were not too concerned about this controversy and Brown’s 
allies sought to put a positive gloss on it by portraying him as a driven, 
demanding and tough but strong and determined leader.  
With compensating strengths or positive qualities in respect of other 
aspects of Greenstein’s model, or in more favourable circumstances with things 
going well, Brown’s insecurities and shortcomings in terms of emotional 
intelligence may not have mattered too much. Brown displayed stamina and 
resilience, but a more even temperament may have been an asset and helped him 
to weather the demands of office and lead his government more successfully. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Borrowing from presidential studies does not mean accepting or assuming that 
the premiership has been or is becoming ‘presidentialized’, rather it involves 
bringing a leadership perspective into the study of British executive politics. The 
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traditional Westminster model, with its institutional and constitutional focus, 
‘de-problematized the question of leadership’ (Bowles et al, 2007, 375). The 
‘core executive’ model tends to marginalise personality and personal leadership 
and to depict government as complex, fragmented and not susceptible to 
personal direction or control from Number 10 in any straightforward sense, 
though Heffernan (2003, 351-2) acknowledges the importance of a prime 
minister’s skill and ability in managing government among their ‘personal power 
resources’, effective use of which can enhance their ‘institutional power 
resources’. The prime minister is not the premiership, and the premiership is not 
the government. Greenstein accepts that individuals, offices and institutions, and 
the system as a whole all need to be studied (Greenstein, 2006, 25). Nevertheless, 
his model helps us better understand the tasks and demands political leaders 
face and the skills they have, and provides a set of benchmarks for assessing, 
evaluating and comparing them.  
 Understanding the ‘prime-ministerial difference’ has arguably become 
even more important as ‘changes in the political and policy environment of 
modern British governments over the past three decades and more rapidly since 
1997 have rendered the British executive all the more dependent on the exercise 
of effective leadership’ (Bowles et al, 2007, 379). Bowles, King and Ross (2007, 
385-6) argue that borrowing from and building on the models and tools of US 
presidential studies will help in debates over prime ministerial power. But the 
real value of Greenstein’s approach is that it moves the focus away from the 
traditional and limited debate about the power of the prime minister and on to 
analysis of what prime ministers do, how they do it, and how well they do it.   
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 In terms of Greenstein’s categories the ideal British prime minister would 
possess an unlikely combination of skills, qualities and attributes. Individual 
prime ministers will have their distinctive strengths and weaknesses under his 
headings. It is difficult to think of a recent prime minister who would rate highly 
on all of his counts (Theakston, 2007). Gordon Brown had clear limitations or 
weaknesses in terms of most aspects of the model. Greenstein helps us to go 
beyond the general media comments about ‘his evident lack of leadership 
qualities’ (The Observer, 7 June 2009). Brown’s experience suggests that modern 
politics probably demands more from leaders in terms of communication skills 
and emotional intelligence than it did in the past. Deborah Mattinson, a New 
Labour pollster, argues politicians now have to be likeable to be successful. In 
the 1980s Thatcher could get away with being respected as a leader but disliked. 
But attitudes to leadership, Mattinson says, have changed and attributes such as 
empathy have become more important.  ‘Is it possible to be a successful 
politician nowadays without attracting some level of public warmth? My 
judgement would be that it is not’ (Mattinson, 2010). 
Besides the argument that Brown was simply ‘unsuited to the job’ of 
being prime minister (Hughes, 2010, 203), he was also clearly very unlucky in 
terms of the circumstances he faced during his time in Number 10. A leader’s 
inheritance, the situation faced, and the problems on the political agenda need to 
be factored in to Greenstein’s model. Brown faced a very hostile operating 
environment or context. Anthony Seldon has argued that had Brown taken over 
earlier – perhaps during Labour’s second term, when the government was in a 
stronger political and economic position – his ‘personal peculiarities’ would have 
proved ‘less of an obstacle’ to positive achievement (Hughes, 2010, 109). Brown 
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is said always to have feared that ‘he would get the premiership too late to make 
a success of it’ (Rawnsley, 2010, 280). In the event, he ran up against a whole 
range of problems that typically handicap multi-term governments and challenge 
‘tail-end’ prime ministers following dominant and long-serving predecessors: 
‘longevity in office and the associated boredom of the electorate; a depleted 
stock of able ministers; loss of reputation for economic competence; an 
increasingly hostile press; internal divisions over policy and the succession; and 
a revived and credible opposition’ (Hughes, 2010, 110; see also: Heppell, 2008). 
Blair’s personality and skills might have been better suited to trying to deal with 
and find a response to these problems.  
In dealing with the global financial and banking crisis, Brown seemed 
more confident and at home than in discharging the normal political and public 
duties of prime-ministerial leadership. His decisive action and the sense that he 
had the experience to make him the right man for the situation may have helped 
him stave off leadership plotters. Normally portrayed as a cautious ditherer, he 
took bold and swift initiatives. ‘He’s really good in a crisis in a subject he 
understands’, admitted a senior civil servant. ‘He’s energised by it’ (Rawnsley, 
2010, 586). And he took the lead in coordinating international action in a way 
that impressed other world leaders. As Rawnsley (2010, 634) put it, he enjoyed 
and was better at being ‘Chancellor of the World’ than prime minister of Britain. 
If he ‘struggled to master many of the other demands of modern leadership’, this 
role gave him a sense of mission, boosted his confidence and played to his 
strengths (Rawnsley, 2010, 598-9). His ‘no time for a novice’ line worked neatly 
against internal party rivals and the Tory opposition, but the political pay-offs 
with the electorate at home seemed less clear, particularly in the face of criticism 
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that he had not addressed the longer-term economic and financial problems that 
built up during his time as chancellor.   
Overall, Brown seems to be someone who was not well equipped for the 
highest office, in terms of the key leadership abilities, characteristics and skills 
that Greenstein identifies. This does not mean that he was or bound to fail and to 
go down to electoral defeat. But in the situation he and the Labour government 
were in after 2007, it made it very much harder to be successful.   
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